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Tasking the American University:
The 1990s
Geoffrey H. Hartman*
The concepts of race, nation, folk, and culture contain questions
and not answers; they are not sociological elements, but rather
complex results. Nevertheless, people refer to them as if they
were unities.
Robert Musil
I take it that one of the urgent questions for the university in the
1990s is: When does the insistence on ethnicity become productive,
and when counterproductive?
The question, you may think, is an impossible one, because it would
be answered differently, even divisively, depending on whether one
belongs to a community still seeking to present its ethnic credentials
or to an established group. Yet if a general agreement exists on what
is productive, a conversation can take place. I think there is such an
agreement and want to state it as follows. The insistence on ethnic
factors intends to further autonomy in both the psychological sense
and cultural sense of the word: the fullest development of each per-
son/family within the community, and of the community within a mul-
ticultural state. I assume, at the same time, that we are not in a
"Balkan" situation, where ethnic groups are striving for political inde-
pendence through secession.'
Even though this definition of a common aim is not conceptually
precise-it does not pause to ask who is a person, what is meant by a
community, what is autonomy-if you respond to the definition some-
thing is gained. Instead of the word "autonomy," which I use here in
the Kantian sense of an ideal situation, in which individuals feel that
the laws of the state or the rules of society are their laws and rules, in
their interest rather than somebody else's, you could use words from
* A longer version of this article appears in New Literary History, Fall 1993.
1. Still one of the best descriptions of the multicultural state is one of the earliest: Randolph
Bourne's "Trans-National America," printed in the Atlantic Monthly of July 1916; reprinted in
Randolph S. Bourne, War and the Intellectuals: Collected Essays, 1915-1919 (New York: Harper
& Row, 1964).
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the Declaration of Independence, citing the right of every citizen to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Let me start with what is counterproductive. Counterproductive, in
my view, is the pressure within each group for ideological conformity
or an outright profession of loyalty. This would make the group a cult
rather than a culture-bearer. It is important that the group tolerates
bystanders who are neutral or still in a reflective stage, that it does not
force acts of witness from its members. The tendency toward the com-
pulsory profession of loyalty was a factor that eventually drove Nazi
Germany into a warlike mentality; in wartime, loyalty must be close to
unconditional. Coming to power, the National Socialists introduced a
Bekenntnis mystique that politicized scholarship and discouraged free
inquiry. Bekenntnis (confession of loyalty) determined Erkenntnis
(cognition and knowledge acquired through scholarship). For exam-
ple, relativity theory was despised because a Jew, Einstein, had formu-
lated it. Everything Jewish was denounced as abstract, rather than
vital, as injurious to the day-to-day concerns of the new German eth-
nic community, the Volksgemeinschaft.
Counterproductive also is a confusion between ethnic and racial.
Nazi Germany is again the extreme and cautionary, though far from
singular, instance. (I have no wish to abuse analogy and identify the
present with the past.) The Germans knew perfectly well that they
were genetically and culturally a mixed bag. But instead of simply
urging a restitutive inward turn, or an anti-cosmopolitan stance (sua-
sions dangerous enough), Nazi ideology, through no fewer than two
ministries, promulgated a deliberate fiction. It claimed that there was
an Aryan character-type, and that Aryan blood was exclusively the
creative force among all ethnic strains.2
Mere assertion, however, can only do so much, even when the
future rather than the past is appealed to. Aryan purity was also
presented as a project, a political fiction that had reconstructive
power, not only for Germany but for the world: "Today Germany,
tomorrow the world." This appeal to the future erased a mixed and
humiliating past or explained it away by race pollution and the con-
spiracy of nations lower in the racial scale against the dominance of
Germany. This so-called Weltanschauung had nevertheless to find
philosophical backing. It did so by resorting to the genius-idea:
2. Hitler's declarations in Mein Kampf, though based on nothing but declarative whim,
became dogma. "What we today see before us of human culture, events in art, scholarship or
technology, is almost exclusively the creative project of the Aryan." G6ring, in justifying the
Ntiremberg racial laws, adds a religious twist. "God created the races. He did not intend
equality... There is no such thing as equality. We ... must fundamentally reject it in our laws
and pledge ourselves [bekennen] to the purity of the race as established by providence and
nature." Das Drine Reich und seine Denker: Dokumente, ed. Leon Poliakov and Josef Wulf
(Berlin-Gruenewald: Verlags-GmBH, 1959), 5, 7.
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genius, the argument held, could not be reduced to rule because it
acted in harmony with an unknown law of nature. It was not imitative
but foundational and nomothetic. (This was an important Romantic
idea, supporting art's inarticulate reason, its "diffrrend" as Lyotard
might say.) Transferred to the corporate and mystical base of the
Volksgemeinschaft, genius was then identified exclusively with the
Aryan character-type, becoming thus not only ethnocentric but also
racist. The boast that the Germans were a Kulturvolk of Denker und
Dichter (Thinkers and Creators), which contributed to the greatest
massacre of modern times, found its support in this racialization of
creativity.
Turning more directly to what is productive, it would seem that just
as the general culture must be acquired or reacquired through univer-
sity study, so must the particular culture of ethnic groups. We are not
in a traditional society where ethnicity is everywhere handed down
through the family and its close coordination with social practices.
The university is essential as a place where one can learn to recover a
heritage that was interrupted or marginalized and to study the history
and literature of other cultures and ethnology generally.
Here we encounter, at the same time, campus activism. How pro-
ductive of autonomy is it to spend time at college this way? Many
students and teachers feel that the extension of ethnic consciousness
to every sphere of life, to every aspect of the university, is called for.
With my question I do not look for a "yes" or "no" but wish to stimu-
late an analysis of the university as a social structure somewhat offside
to society, or to the achievement of specific social reforms. The situa-
tion is complicated by the fact that the university is itself not of one
type. European universities are different from each other as well as
from the American academy, in the United States, moreover, we have
a variety of institutes of higher education: community, city, state, and
private colleges.
In all of these, however, a contradiction is present which may be
anthropologically founded rather than peculiarly American. Univer-
sity study is liminal in Van Gennep's sense: according to this great
ethnographer, the candidate who is tested by initiatory "rites of pas-
sage" must be provisionally separated from his social group before
being accepted in (aggregated) once more. The academy, I suggest,
inserts a second latency period at the very point when adolescent and
social identity-pressures reach a flash point. It is a latency period vis-
A-vis social obligations yet an arousal period vis-A-vis the intellectual
development of the candidate. This sends a mixed signal. Anthropo-
logically it is a time for separating from family and group, a time to go
into the wilderness or through a deliberately induced danger period.
But the academy converts this time into a "moratorium" to allow a
1994]
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protected and structured stage of development away from home. The
contradiction that besets university life as an institutionalized rite of
passage lies in the fact that in traditional societies rituals of initiation
expose the young person to powerful demons in the absence of social
mediation, while in a university setting the danger of direct exposure
is modified by a protective system. This protection guarantees (and
often helps to pay for) an "academic freedom" in which unorthodox
as well as traditional knowledge may be pursued. There is bound to
be confusion, then, when the threshold separating society and univer-
sity is crossed by campus reformers who protest against the society
affording them protection and tolerating their liminal status. It is
unclear, in short, whether universities, as presently organized, are in
fact the ideal places to learn about either (intellectual) freedom or
(social) obligation.3
Yet they remain for the time being the best chance we have for
promoting independence of mind while training the young for specific
social roles. The change since the late 1960s is that it has become
harder to separate university study as a learning opportunity, in which
particular ethnic cultures become an important field, from a protest
movement affirming descent cultures within an institution seen as
predominantly hostile-as a stepmother rather than an alma mater.
And when learning fails to be separated from activism, the result is
omnipolitics. Everything is then subjected to a political test, including
the curriculum.
As long as the general culture is not neglected or falsified, these
intensities are for the good. They enact collectively a hermeneutics of
suspicion directed toward the general culture, toward its covert
assumptions or universalized standards, its smugness or ingrained
xenophobia. But if the culture is perceived only as hostile, the motive
for learning about it is pretty well destroyed. Activism will then
increase that learning disincentive, and substitute a negative convic-
tion for scholarship. A situation is created in which there is no call for
a temporary suspension of judgment, or for comparative study that
would restrain such dispiriting labels as repressive, racist, patriarchal,
colonialist, etc. The activism coming from the right wing is equally
unhelpful: blindly affirmative of the status quo, it also encourages
labeling rather than thoughtful criticism. It confuses the questioning
of common beliefs with subversion, forgetting Emerson's observation:
3. The young in the inner city have less home-protection, but the relative security of
university life is therefore all the more crucial for them. In their case, too, the protective
structure is exposed to stress. A sense of having achieved maturity against terrible odds can
make it more difficult to accept without challenge a protected status based on a second or
extended latency. Those whose childhood has been curtailed by social circumstances may not
only require more catch-up time; they may also fight this need in order to maintain self-reliance
and a degree of separation from the general culture.
[Vol. 6:105
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"We suspect our instruments. We have learned that we do not see
directly, but mediately .... ."4 I can also quote from Karl Mannheim's
Ideology and Utopia:
To see more clearly the confusion into which our social and intel-
lectual life has fallen represents an enrichment rather than a loss.
That reason can penetrate more profoundly into its own structure
is not a sign of intellectual bankruptcy. Nor is it to be regarded as
intellectual incompetence on our part when an extraordinary
broadening of perspective necessitates a thoroughgoing revision
of our fundamental conceptions.
Most of the time it is not the general culture which is being criti-
cized, for what students know of it is too sparse or disheartening; they
see injustice around them, and they react accordingly. The general
culture in its complexity and historical variety may even escape being
explored for a usable past. Wishing to hold reality and justice in one
thought, and having limited time in the university to do so, we are in
danger of turning both reality and justice into very partial concepts.
4. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Experience," The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed.
Brooks Atkinson (New York: Random House, 1992), 322.
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